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Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains

  • 2017.11.1
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Speaker: Huaxia Zeng, Sun Yet-sen University

Topic:

Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains

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Time & Date:

10:30am-12:00pm, 2017/11/3

Venue:

Room 502, Daoyuan Building, CUHK(SZ)

Speaker:

Huaxia Zeng, Sun Yet-sen University

Detail:

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure.
We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain.
We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected+ domains,
and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected+ domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof.
Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise.
Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints (Barbera et al., 1997) where not all alternatives are feasible.
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